This paper examines whether short-term exchange rate expectations move "too much" by comparing them with long-term expectations. We develop a set of nonlinear restrictions linking expectations at different forecast horizons. The restrictions impose consistency, a property weaker than rationality. We use exchange rate survey data to measure expectations and then test whether consistency holds. The data show that a current, positive exchange rate shock leads agents to expect a higher long-run future spot rate when iterating forward their short-terni expectations titan when thinking directly about the long run. In this sense short-horizon expectations may overreact to current exchange rate changes.
Introduction
Much as the value of the dollar has fluctuated during the 1980s, so too has the view that exchange rate determination should be left entirely to an unrestricted foreign exchange market. Only a decade ago, economists were nearly unanimous in endorsing perfectly flexible exchange rates. In addition to Milton Friedman's (1953) persuasive argument that floating rates provided the least costly means of international adjustment, an avalanche of empirical work seemed to reaffirm economists' belief in free markets; empirical tests of spot and forward market efficiency were unable to reject, and a variety of models using sensible fundamentals appeared to explain important aspects of exchange rate behavior. But by the iuid-1980s much had changed: simple efficiency tests had become powerful enough to reject regularly,' and researchers turned pessimistic in their search for models that could explain a positive fraction of exchange rate changes on the basis of fundamentals. The bleak situation was underscored by Meese and Rogoff's (1983) demonstration that a random walk, which cannot explain any positive portion of exchange rate changes, outperformed every model against which it was pitted.2 ratj,raUy, forward market efficiency would he rejected ai a oneer[Ileuce of pittti'r a I jjnr.varying exchange risk premium, or a failure of rational expectations. Frankel and Donihusch (1987) contains a list of ways in winch floating rxcliange ral es have failed to Func Lion as onginahly promised.
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More recently, some economists have begun to revive older Keynesian views that expectations (and to some extent the currency values themselves) may sometimes be driven by animal spirits, and that the behavior of expectations may he responsible for many of the disappointments with floating rates.3 Short-term exchange rate expectations are often thought to fall prey to such forces. Nurkse (1944) for instance, is cited frequently for his fear that short-term expectations were subject to bandwagon effects: a contemporaneous depreciation in the spot exchange rate tends by itself to nake speculators expect additional depreciation, potentially driving the spot rate further away front equilibrium.
Because expectations are unobservable, there is not much direct evidence on the way expectations behave. What little evidence we have, however, would appear at first glance to support Nurkse's suspicion. R-oot (1987h, 1988) use survey data on exchange rate expectations to estimate models of expectations formation and find that shorterterm expectations appear to exhibit the bandwagon effects described by Nurkse, while longer-term expectations do not. However, if agents form their expectations rationally, it is not clear why the mere presence of bandw3gon expectations should be a source of concern. If, for example, the stochastic process generating the exchange rate displays positive serial correlation over short horizons, bandwagon expectations may rationally and passively reflect the behavior of the spot rate.
As one might expect, there is even less evidence that bandwagon expectations fail to be rational over short horizons. Frankel and Froot test, but are not able to reject, the hypothesis that bandwagon predictions are optimal if agents are limited to current and past exchange rate changes when forecasting future changes. Indeed, there is other evidence that seems to support independently the rationality (or near rationality) of shortterm bandwagon expectations. Huizinga (1986) and Kaminski (1987) both find that the On the hehavtor of ezrhange rain and nchange nip expertaiions an l (n.gn,a.i (1985) . Fischer (I 086) Dornhu,eh (1986), and Williamson (1986) . in a more general co,,iext, a utiniher of anthor have suggest,'.1 that 'noise' trm,ter, may appear to trade on the basi, of expectations that are In'at.ional anti even wipre'Iirtal'le. Set' Black (1986) , Dr Loa,g, SWelter. Summer, and Waldman (1987) , and Kyle (ioes). stochastic process governing realized exchange rate changes displays positive serial correlation over short horizons.4 This finding, coupled with the sheer volatility of the spot rate, suggests that tests of rationality are likely to have the problem of low power in distinguishing among nearby alternatives.5
A second problem in tests of rationality in the foreign exchange market, besides low power, is that the usual confidence intervals may not be reliable-Infrequent but important events can create "peso problems" which make the distribution of the regression residuals far from normal, and therefore produce misleading inferences in small samples. Indeed, the notion of peso problems has become so accepted that many recent empirical studies now conclude with partial disclaimers about the reliability of their findings in the presence of such problems-0 In much the sante way, inference may be distorted through the presence of rational stochastic bubbles,1 unless the bubbles form and pop very frequently in the sample.8 In sum, the problems both of low power and nonnormal residuals in small samples tend to limit severely the force of any empirical evidence on the rationality of short-term expectationsIn this paper we use a different and potentially more reliable metric to judge whether short-term expectations move too much: long-term expectations. That is, we test whether agents' expectations at different forecast horizons lead to equivalent predictions of the level of the exchange rate far into the future, a property that we call consistency. Short-term expectations may be said to be inconsistent relative to long-term expectations if a positive shock to the exchange rate leads agents to expect a higher long-run future spot rate when iterating forward their short-term expectations than when thinking directly about the long runICamiucki finds that the real dollar xrhange rate Ia poaitiv.Iv correlate.l over i,,t.crvala ratiging froiu 1 to al,out GO mouth.., awl negatively serially correlated over longer interval,. See Mao Pot,rl,a am1 Sunimner, (1957) am!,1 L,o awl Macl(imtl' (1987) who Rual that U.S. dock return, an positively correlate,1 over short horizo,,, awl negatively correlateal over longer horizons. &5,imm.ra (1986) .U,cui,,es the power to reject inS ere,ting alt.ernativec to the I,yj,otl!e4il t html markets are efEciezt and expected price changes ate cotntallt. 6 Examples include Fama (1984 Fama ( ). ilodrick (1957 .
'See nlsurhard (1979) .
?deese (198;), for example, use, non-parametric methods to test for the presence of mill lea. See alan Ol,atfeld (1987) , who show, how ,taj,dazd inference, may b.c incorrect in the pre,ence of both pe,o prol.lema as!'1 .toclsaal ic lmILl,ble, a Clearly, consistency is a necessary condition if expectations are to be rational. But consistency is weaker than rationality, since it does not require that the expectations process match the stochastic process generating the actual exchange rate. In addition, tests of consistency will be free of many of the statistical problems (such as those created by stochastic bubbles and peso problems) that plague tests of rationality. A failure of short-term expectations to be consistent would imply that even the agents themselves are not willing to live with the long-run implications of their own short-run forecasts.
Naturally, if we are to examine the behavior of expectations independently of the behavior of the actual spot process, we must rely on a measure of the expected future spot rate other than the future realization. Toward this end, we use data from three different surveys of exchange rate expectations. Each of the surveys simultaneously elicits expectations at several forecast horizons, allowing us to test whether the responses in each survey are consistent. In addition, the three surveys include a wide variety of forecast horizons, ranging from one week to one year. We can therefore gain a sense for whether any inconsistency in the data pervades the term structure of agents' expectations, or whether it is confined to very short forecast horizons.
To preview our results, the statistical evidence presented below indicates that expectations do exhibit inconsistencies, although these inconsistencies appear less severe when comparing very short forecast horizons, such as one week and one month. By contrast, both three-and six-month expectations appear to be very significantly inconsistent with expectations at the one-year horizon. However, in terms of economic (rather than statistical) significance the data display a striking similarity across all forecast horizons and currencies: relative to longer-term expectations, shorter-term expectations invariably overreact to an exchange rate shock.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the property of 
Consistency
Let ek,,+k denote the k-period change between t + k and £ in the log of the spot rate expressed in terms of dollars per unit of foreign currency. We denote the market's expectation at time £ of the log percentage change over the same period by mkg+k. As in a vector-autoregressive model, we assume that one-period ahead expectations are formed as a linear combination of current and lagged spot rate changes, aj(L)ej ,, plus other residual factors that are conditionally independent of current and past exchange rate changes:9 = 7i + aj(L)ei,, + it1,,
where
L is the lag operator, and P is the order of the autoregression.10 The assumption that /2j, is strictly orthogonal to current and past exchange rate changes is a strong one, although it is the usual assumption made when estimating vector autoregressions. Ironically, we are on relatively strong ground in this particular case: the failure of both past exchange rate changes and fundamentals11 to predict a positive portion of the current change indicates that exchange rate changes are serially uncorrelated as well as uncorrelated with current and lagged fundamentals. The lack of serial correlation suggests that our estimates will be robust to ntisspeciflcation of P, while the inability of economic fundamentals to explain exchange rate changes suggests that our estimates are robust to the specification and inclusion of these other factors.
Similar to equation (1), the market's expectation of depreciation over the subsequent k periods is given by:
'the autoregreasne represe,tation its equat.ioti (t) is expressed in elsaugn Ispraitac ol thetis rrwheli,uissg evidence that the nominal spot rat. contain, a unit root.
tfl To avoid conf,nion with the notation used below, define the operator L to vietci rite time-I expertal.iou 05cr the appropriate objective density function.
'By funitasue,tals, we mean not only the standard examples saris a, relative ntottcv supplies, ottf.1,itt, anti interest rates, l,ist al,o those which romp out of hewer exchange rat. models, such as the conditional variances of ;isouei-M7 anti fiscal policies (see Ho,lrick, 1987 
Notice that the residual terms pjg and Pk,L in equations (2) and (4), respectively, do not include ex-post prediction errors, and are observable at time I.
We can express the upcoming spot rate change in terms of the same linear combination of current and past changes as equation (1), plus a new residual:
where 6j,j.i = pi,t + 11,I-f-1, and ijj is the one-period prediction error made by the market. To move backwards from equation (5) to (1) we define the operator, E7', which yields the expectation over the market's subjective time-i conditional density function.
The market's prediction of the upcoming spot rate change can then be expressed:
where by construction, Er(ei,,÷j) = mi,,+i and Er(€1.,+1) = Note that if expectations are rational in the sense of Muth, then the market's conditional density function is equal to the objective conditional density function (conditioning on all information available at time t), .Er(.) = E,(.). In that case, equation (6) represents a standard vector-autoregressive model of exchange rate changes. Having made this assumption, we could estimate consistently the expectational parameter vector, aj(L), front equation (5) with ordinary least squares (OLS). However, ii the subjective and objective densities are not precisely equal, then estimation of equation (5) will not generally produce consistent estimates of aj(L). In such a case it would not be appropriate to assuine that the objective conditional expectation of the prediction error is equal to zero, --. e(.p) = 0. Because we are interested in the particular linear combination used in forming expectations, we attempt to estimate equation (6) directly. This procedure is more general than one which relies on equatbn (5), since it allows for, but does 6 not impose, the restriction that agents know the conditional density function of the actual spot process.
In order to develop our test of consistency, we need to express the long-horizon forecasts in equation (3) in terms of the parameters from equation (1). To do this we first rewrite equation (5) as a Ilrst-order autoregressive system: = r + Ax1,, + (+l,
which is given by Consistency will involve restrictions on the companion matrix, A.
By applying iteratively the subjective expectations operator to equation (7), it is straightforward to write the market's expectation of the change in the spot-rate vector, x, between periods t + j and I + j -1:
Equation (8) shows how any expected future one-period change in the spot rate can be expressed as a linear function of current and past exchange rate changes.
Next we use equation (8) to form the expected k-period change given in equation (3).
Note that the k-period expected change in the spot-rate vector from I + k to I is given by = Using this fact and equation (8) we have: Proposition: Given that short-term expectations are formed according to equation
(1), long-term expectations are consistent if and only if the restrictions:
Provided that the assumptions given in equations (2) and (4) hold, the parameters in equations (1) and (3) can be estimated consistently using OLS.
To see how these restrictions operate, consider the simplest case in which agents use only the most recent change in the spot rate to predict the subsequent change, so that traders' views, so that there is no overlap in respondents. We use these data sets to check for the possibility of different characteristics of investors on either side of the Atlantic.13 Table 1 summarizes the coverage of the survey data sets.
It is worth emphasizing that we do not have to treat the median survey response as though it were a perfect measure of the (unobservable) market expectation. The surveys may be subject to the same kinds of problems inherent in any proxy for this elusive variable.
It seems reasonable to suppose that the median investor's expectation is an imprecise estimate of the market's expectation. When agents have different beliefs but their demands can be aggregated into a single representative investor (which is the only way the concept of a unique "market" expectation makes any sense), individuals' expectations would be weighted according to risk tolerance or wealth (see, for example, Rubinstein, 1974) . This implies that the median response will be an imprecise, hut nevertheless unbiased, estimate of the aggregated expectation as long as risk tolerance and wealth are independent of individuals' beliefs about the rate of Future depreciation. A second source of measurement "For more ilet iii on these data 'eli, see Frankel and hoot (198Th) sinE Domiog,ie7. (1980) .
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error arises because only a subsample of the investing population is surveyed. As with any sampling method, the resulting measurement error will be purely random provided that the sample group's expectations do not differ systematically over time from those of the population.
Our estimation strategy allows for these sources of measurement error. Because the survey responses will be used only on the left-hand side of equations (1) and (3), any measurement error the surveys contain will end up in the contemporaneous residuals, ii,t and 4k1' and will not affect our tests of consistency.
Estimation
We estimate systems of the form:
ak.p on the long-horizon residual, /Zkt-From equation (12), consistency implies that Pk,1 = Er(Et_1 >.:'Td g'A'c1÷_1). This term will in general be correlated with d g'A1e1i÷j_) since by the law of iterated projections, the conditional expectation of a future variable follows a martingale. Note that this is true even if the realized short-term residuals are serially uncorrelated, E,(jzi,jzig+i) = 0. In spite of the large measurement error component they no doubt contain, the short-horizon residuals will generally also exhibit correlation over time.
To correct for these problems, we use an extension of the GMM estimate of the parameter covariance matrix suggested originally by Hansen (1982) and modified by Newey and West (1985) . This estimator allows for contemporaneous and noncontemporaneous correlations of unknown form (both across and within forecast horizons). In addition, within this framework it is straightforward to allow for conditional heteroskedasticity in the residuals as well. There is evidence, however, that heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance estimators may tend to bias the standard errors downward. Consequently, and in an effort to be conservative, we estimated both hojuoskedasticity-and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and have reported only the larger of the two.t4 To guarantee that our estimate of the qovariance matrix is positive definite, we follow Newey and West (1985) by discounting ith order autocovariances by 1 -I/(T25 + 1), where T is the number of time-series observations.
In order to specify the lag length P, we began with P = 1 and increased it incrementally. In almost all cases the higher order lags above P = 2 were both economically and statistically insignificant. We present estimates for both P equal to I and 2, although the qualitatively nature of the results does not depend on the precise value of P.
Regression Results
Our first set of tables contains estimates of the system described by equation (13) for
In the re,,ilt, below the ,tanclard error, calculated ,s,jn the,, two method, differed l.y a margin of le than ten perc.it.
See Froot (1987) for evidence on use downward finite sample bias of isnt-ero,krcja,tjritv-rou,i.trnt standard errors.
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the case in which P is set to 1. The second set allow P to be 2. In order to gain a sense for the economic importance of our formal consistency tests, we turn in the second part of this section to a set of figures which display the impact of a contemporaneous exchange rate shock on expected future spot rates. Table 2 reports the regression results for the five currencies included in the Economist survey for the case in which P = 1. The forecast horizons for this survey are three, six and twelve months, so that the system in equation (13) must be extended to allow for three equations instead of two. Table 2 shows thai the coefficients on the current exchange rate change, ajj, I = 3,6,12, are statistically less than zero. In the case of the British pound, for example, the point estimates imply that a 10 percent dollar appreciation over the past three months leads to an expected depreciation of 1.5, 2.0, and 2.8 percent over the following three, six and twelve months, respectively. The coefficients for the other currencies are similar. The last column in Table 2 reports a Wald test of the consistency restrictions given in equations (11) and (12). The data reject consistency for all live currencies. Tables 3 and 4 , respectively, report the results for P = 1 from the New York and London surveys conducted by MMS. Note that the forecast horizons are now shorter, at one week and one month. In both of these tables, most of the coefficients are positive, indicating the presence of a bandwagon effect. At the one week horizon, 6 out of 8 of these are statistically positive at the five percent level. By comparison, only one of the one-month coefficients is statistically positive and, while some are negative, none is statistically less than zero. In the case of the British pound, the coefficients reported in Table 3 imply that a 10 percent dollar appreciation over the past week leads on average to expectations of an additional 1.0 percent appreciation over the following week and a 0.1 percent appreciation over the following month. In these tables, there is little evidence against consistency: only one of the WaId tests rejects at the five percent level. We nevertheless investigate the implications of the point estimates below.
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We cannot test formally the consistency restrictions across data sets, since the models are not nested. Nevertheless, it is important to note that, for all of the currencies, only the shorter-term expectations at the one-week and one-month horizons are related positively to the past exchange rate change. Bandwagon expectations do not appear, however, at any of the longer horizons: the coefficients are negative. Thus, even though we cannot test formally the hypothesis that across surveys the coefficients are the same, the point estimates decline systematically and substantially as the forecast horizon is increased. As we will see in the graphs below, the fact that the short-term estimates are negative and long-term estimates are positive indicates that the short-term expectations will overreact in comparison with long-term expectations. Tables 5, 6 , and 7 present estimates for each of the three surveys when P is set to 2.
While in some cases the added coefficients are statistically significant, they have no effect on the a11 coefficients reported in Tables 2, 3 , and 4. The Wald tests for the Economist data in Table 5 continue to reject the null hypothesis that expectations are consistent.
The New York MMS data set in Tables 6, however, now rejects consistency restrictions in 2 out of 4 currencies (the Swiss franc and yen), both at significance levels of five percent.
The London MMS data in Table 7 , however, do not reject the hypothesis of consistency for any of the currencies.
Graphical Results
Because of the complexity of the cross equation restrictions given by equations (11) and (12), it is difficult to interpret the economic importance of either the Wald test statistics or the parameter estimates in Tables 2 through 7 . In this section we therefore look at the graphical iinplications of our results for the future spot rate path. The pictures can give us a sense (which a Wald statistic cannot) both of the qualitative importance of any inconsistencies, and, more importantly, for whether consistency fails because short-term expectations move too much or too little with respect to long-term expectations.
Consider the following experiment. Assume the exchange rate is a steady state in 13 which current and past exchange rate changes are equal to zero.15 We then shock the spot rate and trace out its expected future path as implied by both the short-and long-horizon forecasts. The graphs of these experiments are presented below.16
Figures 1 through 5 depict the expected future path for each of the five currencies in the Economist survey in the case where P = 1. The initial exchange rate appreciation is one percent. All of the figures show that the ultimate expected effect of an exchange rate shock depends substantially on whether three, six, or twelve month expectations are iterated forward. For example, the paths in Figure 1 for the British pound imply that when the current spot rate is perturbed by 1.0 percent, the long-run spot rate predicted by the three-month expectations is (.88-80)1.80 = 0.10 percent higher than the long-run level predicted by the six-month expectations, and (.88..72)/.72 = 0.22 percent higher than the long-run level predicted by the twelve-month expectations. Across all five graphs, a clear pattern emerges: a positive exchange rate shock generates a higher expected long run value of the spot rate when shorter-run expectations are used than when longer-run expectations are used. Notice, however, that for all three forecasting equations, part of the original one percent dollar appreciation is undone, so that the long-run value increases less than proportionately in response to current shocks.
Figures 6 through 9, and 10 through 13 show the expected future path when P = 1 for the New York and London MMS data sets, respectively. As a group these graphs exhibit two distinctive properties. The first is that within each data set, the one-week expectations overreact to an exchange rate shock in comparison with the one-month expectations. This is the same pattern we saw above. The second distinctive feature of these figures involves a comparison with the Economist graphs. In the MMS data sets, the long run equilibrium 1n order to focus on the dynamic, of the system, we set the coostaid-terms iii e,1itml ion (13) equal to veto in thi, experimes*.
''The paths are constructed by iterating each forecast equation Forwar,l, u,d applying the conditional ex,cctatioo operator.
From equation (1) it is easy to see that using the short forecast horizon (k = 1) we can generate con,ecutivr Future expected changes. Note that at longer forecast horisoos of, say, k periods, forecait., of the spot rate k, 2k. 3k period, in advance are produced by equation (3). However, even when P = I, these forecasts, I.hem,eiws require Forecast, of the spot rate change in 2k -1, 3k -I periods into the future. We use'1 the predictions from cite short-horizon equatioss for the expected change between periods nk and ,,k -1. This procedsre is ,mbiased nuder the rsdl hy1,ot.he.i,, wi,icts state, tint expectations .rc ronsistes. 11 expectations are not consistent, then this method tend.s to n,inimlze the ,,i,senr,l deviations irons consistency. 14 spot rate increases more than proportionately in response to an exchange rate shock. This is a pattern precisely opposite to that demonstrated in the Economist data. Nevertheless, it is still consistent with the finding that shorter-term expectations appear to be more sensitive to exchange rate shocks that are longer-term expectations.
Graphs 14 through 26 parallel exactly the earlier set, with P set to 2. The qualitative results are the sante here as when P was fixed at 1. If anything the increase in the order of the distributed lag increases the visual appearance of the overreaction of short-term forecasts relative to long-terni forecasts (especially in the MMS data, Figures 6-13 and 19-26).
Conclusions
We have derived a property, called consistency, which all rational forecasts have, hut which itself does not require rationality. Our tests using survey data on exchange rate expectations indicate that expectations generally fail to be consistent. Most striking is the particular way in which investors fail to coordinate their predictions: in their shorter-term forecasts, investors tend to exaggerate the implications of current exchange rate changes for the value of the spot rate further into the future. If longer-term forecasts are used as the norm, shorter-tenn expectations overreact to current exchange rate changes.
One possible way to explain the failure of expectations to be consistent is to think of agents using different models to forecast the spot rate at short versus long horizons, and a blend in between. Fankel and Froot (1986) , for example, model the expectations of "chartists" and "fundamentalists" and suggest that agents form expectations by weighting these views according to their own expected trading horizon (with chartist views more important for short horizons, and fundamentalists views more important for long horizons).
But obviously, no single explanation of our findings can be completely satisfying, since a failure of consistency implies that expectations cannot be rational.
A second way to explain the rejections of consistency would be that the survey data systematically mismeasure the market's true expectation.17 If, for example, agents report repeatedly the mode rather than the mean of their subjective distribution, then there is no reason that consistency should hold in these data. Nevertheless, when we tried to test the restrictions developed above using the forward discount in place of the survey measure of expected depreciation, we found results sinjilar to those reported in Tables 2 through   7 . We do not present these results, however, because of the difficulty in interpreting them in view of the likely contamination of the forward market data by an exchange risk premium.18 Nevertheless, one could interpret these results as suggesting that the 'TWe are grateful to tiny Snmmenfo, the following point.
the Forward market test., the coefficie.g, were emaller in a),,ol,ute value than thoce i,re.eute.I ix, Table. 2 . 7, but very ,imilar in sign and statistical significance. In addition, the result, of consistency tests were similar to those reported above.
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explanation for inconsistency found in the survey data is not solely a result of a tendency to misineasure expectations.
One important caveat to keep in mind when interpreting our tests is that the expectations process may not be described completely by the observable history of spot rate changes. If other variables matter for expettations, then our results may be biased, although it is not obvious why the bias would produce the persistent appearance of overreaction in short-term expectations. .mhCn Notes: *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10. S. and 1 percent levels.
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respectively. CMII standard errors, vhich allow for conditional heceroskedascicity and serial correlation, are in parenthesis. *, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 61411 standard errors, which allow for conditional heteroskedasticity and sen correlation, are in parenthesis. Notes: *, ti *** represent statistical significance at the 10. 5. and 1 percent levels.
respectively. GHM standard errors, which allow for conditional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, are in parenthesis. Notes: *, *0, *** represent statistical significance at the 10. 5. and 1 percent levels. respectively. CMJI standard errors, which allow for conditional heteroskedasticicy and sort correlation, are in parenthesis. *, **, *** represent statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. OHM standard errors, which ahoy for conditional heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, are in parenthesis.
